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In recent years, much discussion has been devoted to the relations between cognition and 
mathematical practice, thanks to the work of cognitive scientists, philosophers and histori-
ans of mathematics dedicated to this topic. Initially, the investigation focused in particular 
on the question which ‘core’ cognitive systems might ground several mathematical notions 
and results —especially the number concept. More recently it has moved towards discus-
sion of mathematics as a product of embodied cognition, evaluating the role of conceptual 
metaphors, bodily experience, and external representations in mathematical practice and 
mathematical understanding.
Some of these proposals claim that mathematics is a unique type of human conceptual 
system, sustained by specific neural activity and bodily functions, and brought forth via the 
recruitment of everyday cognitive mechanisms that make human imagination, abstraction, 
and semiotic processes (work on notations) possible. The question of the nature of math-
ematics has been addressed as an empirical issue subject to methodological investigations of 
an interdisciplinary nature, involving hypothesis testing.
At the same time, however, such claims have been received with skepticism, be it that 
they are considered premature or because their actual links with mathematical knowledge, 
properly speaking, are found wanting.
This Special Issue addresses the question, what brings us humans from basic cogni-
tion to the practice of mathematics, gathering together scholars from different disciplines 
with the aim to develop common points of view. The focus is, primarily, on what separates 
mathematics properly speaking from basic cognition, and which cognitive ingredients may 
act as bridges between both. The idea of the Issue came out of the Workshop “From basic 
cognition to mathematical practice” (https://gecomat12.wordpress.com/) that took place 
at the Institute of Mathematics of the Universidad de Sevilla (IMUS) in September 2016. 
However we are not publishing the proceedings of the workshop. The editors have selected 
some of the most interesting talks and asked their authors to further elaborate on the ideas 
presented then.
The result, as the reader will find below, is a varied approach to several questions on 
mathematical practice, mathematical cognition, and specific issues in mathematics. The 
approach is obviously multidisciplinary, featuring elements from cognitive science, his-
tory, philosophy, semiotics, or even archaeology. The topics discussed include cognition of 
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number, proto-arithmetic, geometric cognition and proto-geometry, but also the concept 
of infinity, cognition of time, dynamic elements in mathematical concepts, and quite im-
portantly the cognitive role and functioning of semiotic tools. All authors seem to agree on 
some version of embodied cognition, yet there are big differences as to specific characteris-
tics of the cognitive approach adopted or supported.
Three of the papers bear relations with the cognitive theory of conceptual metaphors, 
put forward by Lakoff and applied to mathematics jointly with Núñez. Rafael Núñez re-
flects on the kind of cognition that makes mathematical practice possible. From a multidis-
ciplinary approach which includes linguistics, ethnography, and of course mathematics, he 
analyses cognitive mechanisms which seem fundamental in the practice of abstracting and 
imagining. The notion of conceptual metaphor is combined with gesture studies in order 
to apply it to specific issues such as motion-based representations in mathematics or the 
conception of time. The second text, by Markus Pantsar, considers numerical cognition 
in the light of a newly proposed basic metaphor, the Process → Object Metaphor, trying to 
overcome some gaps between experimental research on numerical cognition and arithme-
tic properly. Roy Wagner proposes a refreshing view in favor of fallibilism in mathemat-
ics. Confronting two different cognitive stories (as he refers to them), he considers the im-
age of mathematics emerging from them by contrast with conservative or absolutist views 
about mathematics.
José Ferreirós and Manuel García-Pérez question recent cognitive approaches, espe-
cially by Spelke and collaborators, who identify what they call ‘natural geometry’ with Eu-
clidean geometry, presenting this as ‘the’ universal geometry. They consider several experi-
mental results in cognitive science, together with data from comparative history of science 
in different cultures and archeological records, in order to discuss the role of material cul-
ture in the development of geometry. They present so-called ‘basic geometry’ as signifi-
cantly different from the Euclidean theoretical framework.
Starting with a semiotic approach to embodied mathematics, Valeria Giardino reflects 
on the role of notation, formulas or diagrams, as cognitive tools for mathematical practice. 
She explores a particular theoretical framework to situate the role of these tools: Kendal 
Walton’s theory of representation as games of make-believe combined with the notion of 
affordance introduced by James Gibson. Finally, Sorin Costreie presents an original com-
bination of Frege’s late conception of arithmetic as geometrically based with Stanislas De-
haene’s cognitive intuitionism (the “number sense” in its relation with spatial representa-
tions), arguing for their compatibility.
It is our belief that all of these papers introduce relevant contributions to important 
questions about the specificity of mathematical knowledge and its production, cognitive 
ingredients that mediate between basic cognition and intellectual practices, how innova-
tion becomes possible in mathematics, etc. As editors, we would like to thank the authors 
and the referees for their good work, and the journal Theoria for the availability to publish 
the issue. Special thanks go to María José García-Encinas for her help and patience in the 
editorial process.
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